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While the average level of income per capita has increased in China rapidly, income 
inequality is becoming a more serious problem that may threaten social stability and the 
sustainability of economic development. This paper examines the existence in China of 
an inverted U-shaped curve for income inequality and economic development (known 
as the Kuznets curve), and tests for the effects of a series of hypothesized factors 
influencing income inequality.  
Panel data modelling based on provincial level data predicts an increasing trend of 
inequality in the future, but cannot confirm an alleviation of inequality in the long run. 
It is found that a series of factors relating to growth, institutional arrangements, income 
redistribution and social security systems, and provision of public goods and 
infrastructure, is either responsible for the increase, or contributes to the reduction, in 
inequality.  
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During China’s economic reform, especially since the 1990s, income inequality 
between rural and urban areas, among regions and between different social groups, 
increased rapidly. Gini coefficient in China was 32.0 in 1980, dropped to 25.7 during 
the period 1980-84, the initial stage of economic reform, then increased rapidly. In 
1990, it was 35.5, and reached 44.7 in 2001 (World Bank 2004; WIID 2000). China is 
being transformed from a country with high equality in income distribution to one with 
large income gaps. According to the Gini coefficients in the World Bank 2004 report, 
China ranked the 85th (out of 120 economies). Nearest to China is a group of Latin 
American and Sub-Saharan African countries (32 out of 35), many of which have 
problems not only with a highly divided society, but also with long-term economic 
stagnation.  
The deterioration of income distribution is a challenge to social justice, which can lead 
to social conflict, and further undermine economic growth. Of the 35 countries ranking 
below China, 13 had negative GDP per capita growth in 2002-03, constituting the 
majority of the 23 countries with negative growth. This is a warning that serious 
attention needs to be paid to the increasing income inequality.  
This article attempts to answer the following questions. Is there likely an inverted 
U-shaped relationship (known as the Kuznets curve) between the level of economic 
development and income inequality in China, leading to less inequality in the future 
(Kuznets 1955). Furthermore, what factors are responsible for the widening income 
gap? What factors can reduce income inequality? Panel data analyses at the provincial 
level are carried out in the attempt to answer these questions. Policy implications are 
derived. 
2  Literature review and hypotheses  
Fifty years ago, based on an analysis of historical data mainly from US, UK and 
Germany, Simon Kuznets (1955) raised his famous argument: income inequality in 
conjunction with economic development in the developed countries first tended to 
expand and then to shrink. This implies an inverted  U-curve between the level of 
economic development and income inequality, known as the Kuznets curve. This has 
induced considerable debate in the half a century since the article published. Some 
economists have suggested that a widening income inequality is the necessary cost of 
economic development, and that there is no need to worry, as it will eventually be 
corrected by economic growth itself. This argument can be construed to imply that 
efficiency automatically leads to equity. However, other schools are seriously 
challenging this assumption on the basis of theoretical or empirical tools. 
In fact, Kuznets himself does not imply that economic development would eventually 
and unconditionally reduce income inequality. On the contrary, he considers changes in 
income inequality to be the result of a series of economical, political, social and 
demographic conditions. He is critical of two different assumptions: first, that the later-
blooming underdeveloped countries follow the development path of the industrialized 
countries and, second, that the contemporary developing countries are facing new set of 
problems that are totally irrelevant of the historical experiences of the industrialized  
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countries. He argues that both of these assumptions are to be questioned: what is needed 
is a careful analysis of past and present circumstances.  
Kuznets also disagrees with the argument that the developing countries should show 
constraint and do nothing about the expanding income inequality, as was the case with 
the developed countries. According to this author, ‘It is dangerous to argue that 
completely free markets, lack of penalties implicit in progressive taxation, and the like 
are indispensable for the economic growth of the now underdeveloped countries’ 
(Kuznets 1955: 26). 
Kuznets discusses the effects of a few factors on income inequality. Two important and 
correlated factors are industrialization and urbanization. He finds that under certain 
conditions, migration from the agricultural sector to non-agricultural sector and urban 
areas can lead to larger inequality, but reduce inequality afterwards. Changes in the 
saving rate, population growth pattern, and even political systems are also factors 
impacting on income inequality. 
There have been many studies on income inequality after Kuznets. Some empirical 
studies, mainly in the 1970s, confirm the existence of the inverted-U curve (e.g., 
Paukert 1973; Ahluwalia 1976; Ahluwalia, Carter and Chenery 1976), but certain later 
studies indicate that this is not always true (e.g., Deininger and Squire 1996). Some 
authors argue that serious inequality causes political and social instability, and thus 
undermines investment and economic growth, as has happened in Latin America and 
Sub-Saharan African countries (Galor and Zeira 1993; Alesina and Perotti 1996; 
Rodrik  1997). However, if the inequality-induced social conflict eventually leads to 
political reforms promoting democracy and income redistribution, the country may be 
able to escape the trap of inequality and economic stagnation. This, however, is not a 
certainty for all countries (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson 2002).  
Several recent World Bank reports argue that economic growth plays a crucial role in 
poverty reduction, albeit with varying effects among countries, but the reports could not 
show a clear effect on the reduction of inequality. Furthermore, growth itself is, in fact, 
affected by severe inequality. Economic growth is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition in reducing inequality (World Bank 2001, 2003, 2004).  
Bourguignon (2003: 17) concludes from a variety of country-data regressions that: 
First, … it may mean that the various channels through which growth affects 
distribution identified by economic theory are indeed valid but are more or less 
relevant depending on the initial conditions prevailing in a country. … Second, 
country specificity may also mean that there is ample room for policy 
intervention in determining the distributional consequences of growth.  
Based on the literature, we can assume that the fluctuations in income inequality 
associated during certain stages of economic development, as Kuznets proposes, are the 
result of many different factors having either a positive or negative impact on income 
inequality. Some of these play a more prominent role at lower levels of economic 
development, and others become more active at the higher levels of development.   
3 
We can hypothesize that there are four groups of factors that have an effect on income 
inequality, and we test these hypotheses for the direction and effectiveness of their 
impact on income inequality in China. 
The first group of factors relates to economic growth. People commonly assume that 
economic efficiency and equity are a conflicting, and tradeoff pair. When efficiency is 
the central concern, economic growth may be faster, but social equity may be ignored, 
or vice versa. On the other hand, however, economic growth may create more 
employment opportunities, raise the incomes of the poor and thus alleviate poverty. 
Therefore the direction of their effect is uncertain. The variables being considered are 
the economic growth rate, investment ratio (investment to GDP), level of FDI (as a 
proportion of GDP), trade-dependence (ratio of import and export values to GDP), 
urbanization ratio (the share of urban population in total), labour migration ratio (the 
ratio of rural immigrant workers to urban employment), and registered urban 
unemployment rate.  
With respect to urbanization and rural-urban migration, Kuznets points out that 
migration from the agricultural sector to non-agricultural and urban sectors can at first 
cause the low-income urban groups to expand, resulting in higher inequality in urban 
communities without correspondingly reducing rural inequality, Later, however, the 
incomes of the migrants, or of the next generation, can increase, thus reducing urban 
inequality. Furthermore, low-income rural population is reduced when massive 
migration occurs, resulting in a reduction of urban-rural inequality. This effect may be 
more evident in China because surplus rural labour is a serious problem. Urban 
unemployment rate reflects the growth of employment opportunities from the reverse 
direction.  
The second group of factors relates to income redistribution and social security systems. 
Income redistribution under government guidance can reduce inequality, but its 
effectiveness depends on the rationality and efficiency of the system. In this study, the 
author tests the effects of the net transfer payment scheme amongst provinces operated 
through the fiscal system (see Wang and Fan 2003, 2004). Nevertheless, two issues 
should be noticed: first, net transfer payments might have played a role in reducing 
regional income disparity other than reducing inequality within provinces, but this 
cannot be tested by the panel data model in the current study. Second, other studies have 
shown that the current fiscal transfer system is not well designed and its function is not 
clearly defined. This might have undermined its effectiveness on the reduction of 
inequality (see, e.g., Wong 2005).  
In the second group are income distribution schemes such as the basic pension system, 
the unemployment benefit system and the medicare system which are applied in urban 
areas (coverage does not extend to most rural areas). These systems have been 
established in recent years, and their effectiveness still needs to be tested.  
The third group of factors is the provision of infrastructure and other public goods. A 
large volume of the literature stresses the positive effect of public education on the 
reduction of income inequality, because education can increase the stock of human 
capital within middle- and low-income groups and improve their employment and 
income-earning ability. Public infrastructure, such as transport and telecommunication 
facilities, may also benefit this group by bringing them more opportunities for 
employment and self-development. The variables being tested include the average years  
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of schooling, the density of highway and railroad network, and the telephone coverage 
rate.  
The fourth group includes factors relating to institutional arrangements. China, along 
with other transitional economies, has experienced the privatization of public properties. 
In market economy, private property is an important means of earning income; 
consequently, privatization can lead to larger income inequality. However, there are also 
cases showing a reduction of income inequality from market development (see, e.g., 
World Bank 2003). The market-oriented rural reforms in the 1980s significantly 
increased rural incomes in China and reduced the urban-rural income gap at the time. 
Development of urban private sectors in other more advanced marketized areas in later 
periods also contributed to job creation and poverty reduction. By contrast, 
unemployment was observed as an important source of poverty and inequality in certain 
less market-oriented areas. In this context, the marketization index by National 
Economic Research Institute (NERI) (Fan and Wang 2001, 2003, 2004) is used to test 
its impact on income inequality.1  
Inappropriate government intervention in the operations of enterprises, inadequate 
government levies and corruption have been criticized in China. These faulty 
institutional interventions may play role in income inequality. When political power is 
used in the allocation of resources without adequate public monitoring, it induces rent-
seeking behaviour and leads to unfair income distribution. Three variables are used to 
test for possible effects: government intervention on enterprises (using the time 
proportion of entrepreneurs spend in dealing with various government departments), 
enterprises’ non-tax burden (as a proportion of annual sales), and the ‘grey income’ 
index.2 The first two variables are collected from the NERI survey data, covering more 
than 3,000 enterprises, and the grey index calculated from NBS data. All other data are 
from NBS(various years) unless otherwise identified. 
3  Does the Kuznets curve exist in China?  
For an empirical analysis, timeseries data are insufficient for analysing the trends of 
income inequality. To carry out the analysis, the author uses panel data from 1996 to 
2002 across 30 provinces (including the four autonomy regions and four municipalities 
that are under direct central administration; Tibet excluded due to shortage of data). 
There are variations among the different provinces, yet, due to their mutual history, 
                                                 
1  The author recalculates the indexes to make them basically comparable through the whole period, i.e., 
from 1997 to 2002. The 1996 indexes are estimated using a linear extrapolation method based on the 
later years’ data.  
2  The ‘grey income’ is used to label income that recipients are unwilling to disclose. While not 
necessarily illegal income, however, they do relate to the latter. In circumstances of serious corruption 
and illegal income, the ‘grey income’ will certainly increase and may widen income inequality. The 
author calculates this index approximately from consumption expenditures in the following way: first 
defining the total final resident consumption expenses from the NBS provincial GDP account sheets 
as real resident consumption, then using the reported consumption expenses from the NBS urban and 
rural household surveys in different provinces, and the provincial urban and rural population data, to 
derive the reported resident consumption. The difference between the two types of consumption, as a 
percentage of the former, is defined as ‘grey income index’. A higher grey income index may imply 
more serious corruption in the relevant province.  
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cultural tradition, economic and political systems, policy environment, similar 
experiences with economic reforms and common markets, their development paths 
should at least show some resemblance to each other. This is to say, the future of the 
less-developed provinces should, to a certain extent, resemble the present-day 
development level of the relatively more advanced provinces. This makes the panel data 
analysis valid. 
Gini coefficients at the provincial level covering both urban and rural residents are not 
available. Instead, the author uses separate Gini coefficients for urban and rural 
residents as the dependent variables. For the urban-rural income gap, the author uses the 
ratio between per capita urban disposable income and per capital net rural income as the 
dependent variable. Thus, three functions are needed for income inequality in the urban 
areas, rural areas and between urban and rural areas, respectively.  
Two alternative functional forms of the models are tested. Models 1.1, 2.1 and 3.1 (we 
can term these as ‘version-1’ of the models) include the provincial GDP per capita and 
its quadratic term at the LHS. This functional form implies an inverted U-curve, once it 
is concave, with symmetrical increasing and decreasing sections. However, the results 
of international empirical analyses obtain non-symmetrical curves (see, e.g., Deininger 
and Squire 1996). Some Chinese data also seem to indicate similar shaped curves (see 
Figure 1). For this possibility, a logarithm form of the models with a log-quadratic term 
GDP per capita is defined (models 1.2, 2.2 and 3.2; we term these as ‘version-2’). This 
functional form also allows non-decreasing trends of income inequality.  
It is argued in the literature that a correct functional form should lead to zero inequality 
when income is zero (Wan 2002). For this reason, the constant term should be excluded 
for the ordinary quadratic models. However, given that the models are expected to 
represent real-world trends, it may be more important to keep the fitted values as 
accurate as possible within a realistic income range. For example, in the case of China, 
 
Figure 1 
Relationship between rural Gini coefficient and GDP per capita (RMB) 
Provincial data, 1996 to 2002  
 
Source:   Data from NBS (various years).   
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this would probably imply RMB 1,000-10,000 per year. And whether they are accurate 
at the extreme values may not be important. The constant terms are, therefore, retained 
in order to avoid a forced change in the slopes of the fitted curve.  
The followings are the two versions of the models respectively for urban, rural, and 










































it (3.2)   
where GINIuit, GINIrit, and RUDit are the urban and rural Gini coefficients and urban-
rural income ratio, respectively, of the ith province in year t, Yit is per capita GDP of the 













it are the error terms.  
Version-1 for urban and rural income inequalities indicates highly significant and 
positive estimates of per capita GDP, as well as significant and negative estimates of its 
quadratic term. This implies an inverted U-curve of income inequality. Some estimates 
of version-2 are insignificant, but all three models of version-2 have higher R
2s than 
their version-1 counterparts. Version-2 is therefore preferred. In particular, one should 
consider the fact that in version-1, Gini coefficients are forced to decrease earlier or 
later once a concave function is obtained, whereas version-2 leaves more room for 
different possibilities. Table 1 shows the results. 
Table 1 
Estimates of the income inequality models (fixed effect)  
  Model 1.1  Model 1.2  Model 2.1  Model 2.2  Model 3.1  Model 3.2 










































2 (within) 0.4829  0.5460  0.1871 0.2154 0.1181 0.1236 
Note:   Numbers in parentheses are t ratios. * are significant at the 5% level, and ** are at the 1% level.   
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According to the estimates, both version-1 and version-2 of the models predict 
increasing income inequality in urban and rural areas, and between urban and rural 
residents in a considerably long period, at least before reaching the per capita GDP level 
of RMB 20,000. According to version-1, income inequality in urban and rural areas, and 
between urban and rural residents, will reach the maximum at per capita GDP levels of 
RMB 30,000, 20,000 and 50,000, respectively, and then start to decrease. According to 
version-2, urban inequality will not diminish in the extreme long term, i.e., before a 
GDP per capita level of RMB 2 million is achieved. This is practically indifferent to a 
non-decreasing function. Rural inequality will achieve the maximum at a per capita 
GDP level of RMB 25,000 before contracting, and urban-rural income inequality will 
never decrease.  
With regard to the above, we should note that most of the observations in per capita 
GDP are below the RMB 20,000 level except for the three mega cities, i.e., Beijing, 
Shanghai and Tianjin. This implies low creditability of the fitted Gini coefficient at per 
capita GDP level exceeding RMB 20,000, a level will not be reached at the national 
average until around 2012. Therefore, based on either versions 1 or 2, it is risky to 
predict a decrease in income inequality in the distant future. 
To summarize, both versions of all three models predict an increase in inequality in the 
long term. Both the fitted urban and rural inequality functions show indications of the 
Kuznets curve only mathematically, but the decreasing phase cannot be predicted 
definitely for the foreseeable future. Version-2 of the urban-rural income inequality 
function is an increasing function and does not have the Kuznets characteristic.  
4   What factors are influential for income inequality?  
In this section, the hypotheses of the four groups of factors affecting income inequality, 
mentioned earlier in this article, are tested with models expanded from the above. A 
number of variables are added to models 1-3 to estimate their effect on income 
inequality, and to test how much of the income effect on inequality can be replaced.  
Again, both the ordinary quadratic version and the log quadratic version of the models 
are tested. They are called versions 3 and 4, expanding from versions 1 and 2, 
respectively. For simplicity, only version-4, i.e., the log functions, is specified in the 





























it (3.4)   
where GINIu, GINIr are urban and rural Gini coefficients, respectively; RUD is the 
urban-rural income ratio; YR is the GDP growth rate; RI is the investment ratio; RFI is 
the ratio of FDI in total investment; OPEN is the ratio of imports and exports to GDP, 
reflecting economic openness or trade-dependence; URB is the urbanization ratio; UEM 
is the registered urban unemployment rate; TRP is the per capita net transfer payment; 
RPE, RUE and RME are the coverage rates of the urban pension, unemployment benefit 
and medicare systems, respectively; RWD and HWD are the railroad and highway 
network densities; TEL is the telephone coverage rate; ED is the average year of 
schooling of the population above six years of age; MKT is the marketization index; 
LM is the labour migration ratio; GI is a variable of government intervention; EB is 
non-tax burden of enterprises; GY is the grey income index; A
u, A
r, and A
d are the 
constants, and εu, ε
r, and ε
d are error terms of the three models. The subscripts i and t 
represent province and year, respectively.  
As data in a few provinces are missing for some of the years, these variables, the author 
estimated the data via linear projections.  
Estimation results show that the logarithm version (version-4) has higher R squares than 
their version-3 counterparts, and the former has more estimates as significant in general, 
making it therefore preferred. Hausman tests favour the fixed-effect model for models 
1.4 and 3.4, but the random-effect model for model 2.4. The variables that resulted in 
very low t ratios were dropped from the model. Considering that the quality of some 
data is not good (although being the best available), and that this may affect their level 
of significance, a 10 per cent significance criterion is accepted. Full results of both 
versions 3 and 4 are shown in the Appendix. The estimates from the preferred models 
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it (2.4)   







it (3.4)   
Both the urban and urban-rural inequality models (1.4 and 3.4) show relatively high 
explanatory power; their R
2s (within) are between 0.6-0.7. R
2 (overall) of the rural 
inequality model (random effect) is 0.43. Per capita GDP and its quadratic term, both in  
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logarithm, are significant in all three models. Meanwhile, a number of other factors are 
noted to have an impact on the Gini coefficient.  
First, factors relating to economic growth show a possible, albeit unconfirmed, effect of 
expanding urban income inequality. In Model 1.4, the investment ratio, FDI ratio and 
trade dependence all have positive signs with t ratios above 1, although insignificant. 
Trade  dependence has a positive and significant impact on urban-rural income 
inequality at the 1 per cent significance level, possibly due to its positive effect on urban 
incomes but less effect on rural incomes. Not surprisingly, urban unemployment rate is 
positively related with urban Gini coefficient, confirming that unemployment is one of 
the reasons causing inequality. 
The effect of economic growth on rural inequality and the urban-rural income gap is 
negative, and significant for the rural inequality model at the 5 per cent level. These are 
likely due to the fact that higher economic growth generates more employment 
opportunities, thus helping to transfer rural labour to non-agricultural sectors, which 
reduces rural poverty.  
The urbanization ratio and labour migration ratio are dropped from the models because 
of their low, although negative, t-ratios. Their insignificance is probably due to the 
reason discussed by Kuznets, i.e., their short-run and long-run effects on inequality have 
opposite impact. Another possible reason for the insignificance of the labour migration 
ratio may be that it originates within the destination provinces and thus includes cross-
province immigrants but excludes emigrants to other provinces. 
With regard to the second group, i.e., transfer payments and social security systems, the 
fiscal transfer payment is found to have a negative impact on urban Gini coefficient, but 
positive one on rural Gini and urban-rural income gaps, all significant at the 1 per cent 
or 5 per cent levels. This suggests that the transfer payment system was used by 
governments at the provincial and lower levels mainly in urban areas; and even when 
utilized in rural areas, it was not to help low-income residents (were, instead, targeted 
mainly to investments or to supplement the wage expenditures of local government and 
public sectors). However, according to our results, it does help low-income people in 
urban communities. 
The objective of social security systems is to help reduce inequality. However, only the 
unemployment benefit scheme is shown to have a negative effect on the urban Gini, 
whereas surprisingly both the pension and medicare systems have positive and 
significant effects on urban Gini coefficient. The former effect once again indicates that 
unemployment is one of the factors causing income inequality, whereas the results for 
pensions and medicare suggest that the urban middle- and high-income groups may 
benefit more from these systems than the low-income groups. They may relate to 
shortcomings either in the system design or practice. According to the results of an 
unpublished NERI survey in 2005, the average medical expense reimbursement from 
the medicare system is higher for urban middle- and high-income groups than for low-
income groups. The same is evident in the reimbursement ratio of the medicare system 
for per capita medical expenses, i.e., coverage is also higher for the middle-income 
group than for the latter. This indicates the existence of obstacles in the coverage of 
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Figure 2-2 





































Note:   The horizontal axis is GDP per capita (RMB), the vertical axis in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 indicates 
Gini coefficient (%), and that in Figure 2.3 indicates the ratio of urban per capita income to rural 
per capita income. 
Source:   Based on the modelling results.  
 
In addition, these systems are yet to be established in most rural areas, and thus only 
urban residents benefit from these in general. This explains why the medicare system 
has a positive effect on urban-rural income inequality.  
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In connection with the third group, i.e., public goods and infrastructures, the average 
years of schooling surprisingly show a positive and significant impact on urban Gini. Its 
estimate for urban-rural inequality is negative, but insignificant. The former result is a 
strong indication of the fact that education opportunities are unequally distributed 
among different social groups, and the poor are disadvantaged with regard to education. 
The insignificance of the latter estimate may also indicate that delivery of rural public 
education is inadequate for reducing urban-rural inequality.  
In terms of the relationship between transport and telecommunication facilities and 
income inequality, both the railroad and highway densities have negative estimates; the 
former on the rural Gini coefficient and the latter on the urban-rural income gap, both of 
which are significant at the 10 per cent level. These results suggest that the development 
of transport facilities helps rural residents. An unusual result is the positive and 
significant effects of telephone coverage on rural Gini coefficient and urban-rural 
income gap, although this is not the case for urban Gini. This may imply that telephone 
usage is basically limited to urban residents and middle- and high-income groups in the 
rural regions, where in 2003, only 45 per cent of the households had fixed telephones. 
However, the significant result, on the other hand, highlights the importance of 
telecommunications in the growth of household income.  
Finally, with respect to institutional factors, the marketization index indicates a likely 
negative effect on both urban and rural Gini coefficients. The estimates are not 
significant, although both t ratios are greater than 1, and statistical tests reject the null 
hypothesis. The non-tax burden and the grey income index have positive estimates on 
urban inequality. The former is significant at the 5 per cent level, and the latter close to 
the 10 per cent level. These imply that inadequate government levies and corruption can 
change income distribution, leading to greater inequity.  
The fitted curves of versions 2 and 4 for the three models are illustrated in Figures 2.1, 
2.2 and 2.3, respectively. In each of the figures, the grey curve represents version-2 of 
the models (with only lnY and (lnY)
2 at the LHS), and the black curve represents 
version-4 (with other explanatory variables). As one can see from Figure 2.1, there is a 
large difference between the two inequality curves for urban communities. This means 
that when more explanatory variables are included, a large portion of urban inequality, 
formerly explained by the GDP per capita and its quadratic term, is now explained by 
other variables. But as shown in Figure 2.2, the two rural inequality curves are similar, 
indicating that only a limited part of the rural inequality is accounted for by non-income 
variables. The two urban-rural inequality curves are quite similar at the lower income 
level, but diverge greatöu at the higher income level. This indicates that the urban-rural 
inequality is heavily influenced by explanatory variables at the higher income levels.  
The 2002 values of various variables at the provincial level are introduced in the 
estimated functions (models 1.4, 2.4 and 3.4) to indicate the magnitude of their 
contribution to income inequality. Note that the contributions to both urban and rural 
Gini coefficients are percentage points (defined similarly to the Gini coefficient, i.e., 
100 per cent equals extreme inequality and 0 per cent perfect equality), and the 
contributions to urban-rural inequality are the values as a part of the urban-rural income 




Contribution of variables influencing inequality (2002) 
Contribution to inequality 
Influencing factors  Variable
Average 
value  Urban % Rural %  Urban-rural
GDP per capita (RMB, 1996 prices)  Y  10087       
log GDP per capita  lny  9.22  672.41  380.56  72.27 
Square log GDP per capita  (lnY)
2 84.99  -317.10  -184.09 -39.07 
GDPgrowth rate (%)  GDPR  11.72    -2.73  -0.06 
Investment ratio (investment/GDP, %)  RI  39.70  2.04  0.00   
FDI ratio (FDI/fixed investment, %)  RFI  6.48  0.39  -0.88   
Trade dependence (import&export value to GDP, %) OPEN  29.02  1.00    0.27 
Urban unemployment rate (%)  UEM  3.86  1.29     
Net transfer payment (RMB, 1996 priceZ)  TRP  106.94  -0.44  0.79  0.03 
Coverage of the pension system (%)  RPE  20.75  2.59     
Coverage of the unemployment benefit (%)  RUE  64.06  -1.99     
Coverage of the medicare system (%)  RME  60.32  1.16    0.21 
Railway density (km/100 km
2) RWD  24.87    -1.12  -0.09 
Highway density (km/100 km
2) HWD  17.74      -0.15 
Telephone coverage (sets/100 people) TEL  18.02    4.58  0.73 
Years of schooling above 6 yrs old (person/year) ED  7.82 14.10    -0.51 
Marketization index  MKT 5.98  -3.91  -3.06   
Non-tax burden to enterprises’ sales (%)  EB  2.42  4.85     
Grey income index (%)  GY  6.56  0.33     
Constant C  1.00  -346.17 -161.21  -30.64 
Contribution of GDP p.c.+unidentified+error     7.19  34.49  2.55 
Sum contribution of other factors     21.41  -2.41  0.42 
Aver. urban/rural Gini and urban-rural ratio      28.60  32.08  2.97 
Notes:    The railroad and highway densities are calculated as the length of network lines (km) per 
100 km2 of provincial territory, both converted into standard length of grade II highway. The 
conversion factor between railway and standard grade II highway is 14.7. 
  Gini coefficients measured in percentages, and urban-rural income ratio is the urban per capita 
disposable income to rural per capita net income.  
Source:   Calculated from the estimation results and NBS (2003, 2004). 
 
Table 2 presents some noteworthy findings. For example, the urban income inequality is 
explained by the following: 
—  In 2002, the provincial average of the Gini coefficient is 28.6 per cent, of 
which three-quarters can be explained by factors other than GDP per capita; 
—  Education or the lack of it (should be explained as unequal opportunities of 
education) is the most important factor leading to greater inequality, and 
increased the urban Gini coefficient 14.1 percentage points; 
—  Another important factor is the combined effect of non-tax burden of 
enterprises and grey income index. This indicates inadequate government 
levies and corruption, and expanded the urban Gini coefficient by 5.2 
percentage points;  
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—  The current pension and medicare systems do not reduce urban inequality, but 
instead enlarge it, because middle- and high-income groups acquire greater 
benefit from these systems than low-income residents. The effect on urban 
Gini coefficient is 3.7 percentage points. This indicates that the current social 
security systems need to be improved and coverage extended to low-income 
groups; 
—  It is likely that urban inequality expands via short-run economic growth factors 
(investment ratio, FDI ratio and economic openness), the effects of which 
jointly contributed to the 3.4 percentage point expansion in urban Gini. 
However, economic growth also creates more employment opportunities and 
increases the income of all resident groups, a fact which is not fully reflected in 
this modelling exercise. The employment effect on inequality reduction is 
partially reflected from the reverse impact of urban unemployment rate, which 
the affected urban Gini coefficient by 1.3 percentage points; 
—  Of the factors reducing inequality, marketization seemingly plays an important 
role, making a 3.9 percentage point contribution to the reduction of urban Gini. 
But it does not fully offset other institutional effects that increase inequality. 
This implies that under a transparent, well-designed institutional framework, 
marketization may contribute to the reduction of inequality; 
—  The unemployment benefit system makes an important contribution to 
inequality reduction in urban areas, and reduces the urban Gini coefficient by 
2 percentage points.  
—  Fiscal transfer payments reduce urban Gini by 0.4 percentage point. 
Considering its large scale, the contribution is modest. Furthermore, it 
increases rural inequality, and urban-rural inequality. This highlights the 
importance of redefining the functions of the fiscal transfer system and of 
increasing its efficiency for both supporting local development and reducing 
income inequality. 
The above outcomes indicate that income inequality will not automatically decrease as 
the economy improves. To the contrary, the fluctuations in income inequality are the 
results of many factors, which may either increase or decrease inequality under certain 
conditions. The critical issue is to reform and finalize the public policy framework in 
order to maintain a relative equity society with low efficiency losses. 
5  Conclusion and policy implication 
The empirical analysis in this study leads to the following conclusions and policy 
implications: 
—  The modelling analysis using China’s provincial level panel data from 1996 to 
2002 predicts a continued increase in income inequality in the coming decade, 
but cannot firmly predict a reduction of inequality in a foreseeable future, and 
thus is unable to verify the existence of the Kuznets curve in China;   
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—  As discovered in this study, increases in inequality in China are closely related 
to a series of non-income factors; 
—  While short-run economic growth factors are shown to have possible positive 
effect on Gini coefficients, the creation of employment opportunities, resulting 
from by economic growth, is crucial for reducing inequality, especially in the 
rural areas, and for bridging the gap in rural-urban incomes; 
—  The positive and significant effect of education level on inequality implies the 
existence of unequal education opportunities among different social groups, 
between urban and rural residents, and among regions. The completion of nine-
year compulsory education needs to be reexamined, and the necessity of 
twelve-year compulsory education may need to be considered;  
—  The density of railway and highway systems is observed to have negative 
effect on rural Gini and urban-rural inequality. In China, there are still 173 
towns and townships and 56,000 villages not connected to the highway 
network (Ministry of Transportation 2004), and the lack of transport 
infrastructure is an important reason for rural poverty and income inequality. 
While huge investments have been made to freeway construction, the rural 
road systems needs improvement, for both reducing inequality and developing 
the economy;  
—  Institutional factors can have both positive and negative roles in income 
inequality. Marketization does not necessarily lead to increases in inequality, 
but may under certain circumstances lead to its alleviation. It is, therefore, 
important to improve the institutional framework supporting the market 
system, in order to eliminate inadequate government behaviour, and to fight 
corruption;  
—  Currently, development of the urban social security systems has shown a trend 
of ignoring the low-income urban groups, increasing the urban Gini 
coefficient. This trend needs to be reversed, and a minimal security system for 
rural residents should be considered; and  
—  While the current fiscal transfer system shows a minor effect on reducing 
urban inequality, it is noted to have increased rural, and urban-rural 
inequalities. This indicates inadequate usage of the transfer payments scheme, 








Appendix: Estimation results  
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Note:   Numbers in parentheses are t ratios. Those with ’ are significant at the 10% level, with * are 
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